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Abstract
In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol
analysis, cryptographic protocols and (Dolev-Yao) intruders are
modeled by Horn theories and security analysis boils down to
solving the derivation problem for Horn theories. This approach
and the tools based on this approach, including ProVerif, have
been very successful in the automatic analysis of cryptographic
protocols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions. However,
dealing with the algebraic properties of operators such as the ex-
clusive OR (XOR) has been problematic. In particular, ProVerif
cannot deal with XOR.
In this paper, we show how to reduce the derivation problem
for Horn theories with XOR to the XOR-free case. Our reduc-
tion works for an expressive class of Horn theories. A large class
of intruder capabilities and protocols that employ the XOR op-
erator can be modeled by these theories. Our reduction allows
us to carry out protocol analysis by tools, such as ProVerif, that
cannot deal with XOR, but are very efficient in the XOR-free
case. We implemented our reduction and, in combination with
ProVerif, applied it in the automatic analysis of several proto-
cols that use the XOR operator. In one case, we found a new
attack.
1 Introduction
In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic proto-
col analysis, cryptographic protocols and the so-called Do-
lev-Yao intruder are modeled by Horn theories. The secu-
rity analysis, including the analysis of secrecy and authen-
tication properties, then essentially boils down to solving
the derivation problem for Horn theories, i.e., the question
whether a certain fact is derivable from the Horn theory.
This kind of analysis takes into account that an unbounded
number of protocol sessions may run concurrently. While
the derivation problem is undecidable in general, there are
∗An abridged version of this paper appears in CCS 2008 [16]. This
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Science and Education under Grant 3 T11C 042 30.
very successful automatic analysis tools, with ProVerif [2]
being one of the most promintent ones among them, which
work well in practice.
However, dealing with the algebraic properties of opera-
tors, such as the exclusive OR (XOR), which are frequently
used in cryptographic protocols, has been problematic in
the Horn theory approach. While ProVerif has been ex-
tended to deal with certain algebraic properties in [4], asso-
ciative operators, which in particular include XOR, are still
out of the scope. Even though there exist some decidability
results for the derivation problem in certain classes of Horn
theories with XOR [9, 20, 14], the decision procedures have
not led to practical implementations yet, except for the very
specific setting in [14] (see the related work).
The goal of this work is therefore to come up with a
practical approach that allows for the automatic analysis
of a wide range of cryptographic protocols with XOR, in
a setting with an unbounded number of protocol sessions.
Our approach is to reduce this problem to the one without
XOR, i.e., to the simpler case without algebraic properties.
This simpler problem can then be solved by tools, such as
ProVerif, that a priori cannot deal with XOR, but are very
efficient in solving the XOR-free case. More precisely, the
contribution of this paper is as follows.
Contribution of this paper. We consider an expressive
class of (unary) Horn theories, called ⊕-linear (see Sec-
tion 3). A Horn theory is ⊕-linear, if for every Horn clause
in this theory, except for the clause that models the in-
truder’s ability to apply the XOR operator (I(x), I(y) →
I(x⊕y)), the terms that occur in these clauses are ⊕-linear.
A term is ⊕-linear if for every subterm of the form t⊕ t′ in
this term, it is true that t or t′ does not contain variables.
We do not put any other restriction on the Horn theories.
In particular, our approach will allow us to deal with all
cryptographic protocols and intruder capabilities that can
be modeled as ⊕-linear Horn theories.
We show that the derivation problem for ⊕-linear Horn
theories with XOR can be reduced to a purely syntactic
derivation problem, i.e., a derivation problem where the al-
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gebraic properties of XOR do not have to be considered any-
more (see Section 3, 4, and 5). Now, the syntactic deriva-
tion problem can be solved by highly efficient tools, such
as ProVerif, which cannot deal with XOR. We believe that
the techniques developed in this paper are interesting be-
yond the case of XOR. For example, using these techniques
it might be possible to also deal with other operators, such
as Diffie-Hellman-Exponentiation.
Using ProVerif, we apply our two step approach—first
reduce the problem, then run ProVerif on the result of the
reduction—to the analysis of several cryptographic proto-
cols that use the XOR operator in an essential way (see
Section 6). The experimental results demonstrate that our
approach is practical. In one case, we found a new attack
on a protocol.
We note that a potential alternative to our approach is to
perform unification modulo XOR instead of syntactic uni-
fication in a resolution algorithm such as the one employed
by ProVerif. Whether or not this approach is practical is
an open problem. The main difficulty is that unification
modulo XOR is much more inefficient than syntactic unifi-
cation; it is NP-complete rather than linear and, in general,
there does not exist a (single) most general unifier.
Related work. In [9, 20], classes of Horn theories (secu-
rity protocols) are identified for which the derivation prob-
lem modulo XOR is shown to be decidable. These classes
are orthogonal to the one studied in this paper. While ⊕-
linearity is not required, other restrictions are put on the
Horn clauses, in particular linearity on the occurrence of
variables. The classes in [9, 20] do, for example, not contain
the Recursive Authentication and the SK3 protocol, which,
however, we can model (see Section 6). To the best of our
knowledge, the decision procedures proposed in [9, 20] have
not been implemented. The procedure proposed in [9] has
non-elementary runtime.
In [19, 14, 13], the IBM 4758 CCA API, which we also
consider in our experiments, has been analyzed. Notably,
in [14] a decision procedure, along with an implementation,
is presented for the automatic analysis of a class of security
protocols which contains the IBM 4758 CCA API. However,
the protocol class and the decision procedure is especially
tailored to the IBM 4758 CCA API. The only primitives
that can be handled are the XOR operator and symmetric
encryption. All other primitives, such as pairing, public-key
encryption, and hashing, are out of the scope of the method
in [14]. The specification of the IBM 4758 CCA API in [14]
is hard coded in a C implementation.
In [4], it is described how the basic resolution algorithm
used in ProVerif can be extended to handle some equational
theories. However, as already mentioned in that work, as-
sociative operators, such as XOR, are out of the scope of
this extension.
In [11], the so-called finite variant property has been stud-
ied for XOR and other operators. It has been used (implic-
itly or explicitly) in other works [12, 9], and also plays a
role in our work (see Section 4).
In [7, 12, 15], decision procedures for protocol analysis
with XOR w.r.t. a bounded (rather than an unbounded)
number of sessions are presented. The notion of ⊕-linearity
that we use is taken from the work in [15]. That work also
contains some reduction argument. However, our work is
different to [15] in several respects: First, of course, our
approach is for an unbounded number of sessions, but it is
not guaranteed to terminate. Second, the class of proto-
cols (and intruder capabilities) we can model in our setting
is much more general than the one in [15]. Third, the re-
duction presented in [15] heavily depends on the bounded
session assumption; the argument would not work in our
setting. Fourth, the reduction presented in [15] is not prac-
tical.
Structure of this paper. In Section 2, we introduce Horn
theories and illustrate how they are used to model crypto-
graphic protocols by a running example. The notion of
⊕-linearity is introduced in Section 3, along with a propo-
sition that is the key to our main result, i.e., the reduction.
The reduction is then presented in Section 4, with exten-
sions to authentication presented in Section 5. We discuss
our implementation and experimental results in Section 6.
Proofs omitted in the main part of the paper are presented
in the appendix.
We point the reader to [17] for our implementation.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce Horn theories modulo the XOR
operator and illustrate how these theories are used to model
the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder and cryptographic proto-
cols by a running example.
Horn theories
Let Σ be a finite signature and V be a set of variables. The
set of terms over Σ and V is defined as usual. By var(t) we
denote the set of variables that occur in the term t. We as-
sume Σ to contain the binary function symbol ⊕ (exclusive
OR), as well as a constant 0. To model cryptographic proto-
cols, Σ typically also contains constants (atomic messages),
such as principal names, nonces, and keys, the unary func-
tion symbol hash(·) (hashing), the unary function symbol
pub(·) (public key), and binary function symbols such as
〈·, ·〉 (pairing), {·}· (symmetric encryption), and {|·|}· (pub-
lic key encryption). The signature Σ may also contain any
other free function symbol, such as various kinds of signa-
tures and MACs. We only require that the corresponding
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intruder rules are ⊕-linear (see Section 3), which rules that
do not contain the symbol ⊕ always are.
Ground terms, i.e. terms without variables, are called
messages. For a unary predicate q and a (ground) term
t we call q(t) a (ground) atom. A substitution is a finite
set of pairs of the form σ = {t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn}, where
t1, . . . , tn are terms and x1, . . . , xn are variables. The set
dom(σ) = {x1, . . . , xn} is called the domain of σ. We de-
fine σ(x) = x if x /∈ dom(σ). The application tσ of σ to a
term/atom/set of terms t is defined as usual.
We call a term standard if its top-symbol is not ⊕; oth-
erwise, it is called non-standard. For example, the term
〈a, b⊕ a〉 is standard, while b⊕ a is non-standard.
A non-standard subterm s of t is called complete, if either
s = t or s occurs in t as a direct subterm of some standard
term. For instance, for t = 〈a⊕{(x ⊕ y)⊕ z}y, b〉, the terms
a⊕{(x⊕ y)⊕ z}y and (x⊕y)⊕z are complete non-standard
subterms of t, but x⊕ y is not.
To model the algebraic properties of the exclusive OR
(XOR), we consider the congruence relation ∼ on terms
induced by the following equational theory (see, e.g., [12,
7]):
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x (x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z) (1)
x⊕ x = 0 x⊕ 0 = x (2)
For example, we have that tex = a⊕b⊕{0}k⊕b⊕{c⊕ c}k ∼
a. (Due to the associativity of ⊕ we often omit brackets and
simply write a⊕ b⊕ c instead of (a⊕ b)⊕ c or a⊕ (b⊕ c).)
For atoms q(t) and q′(t′), we write q(t) ∼ q′(t′) if q = q′
and t ∼ t′. We say that two terms are equivalent modulo
AC, where AC stands for associativity and commutativity,
if they are equivalent modulo (1). A term is ⊕-reduced if
modulo AC, the identities (2), when interpreted as reduc-
tions from left to right, cannot be applied. Clearly, every
term can be turned into ⊕-reduced form and this form is
uniquely determined modulo AC. For example, a is the ⊕-
reduced form of tex.
A Horn theory T is a finite set of Horn clauses of the
form a1, . . . , an → a0, where ai is an atom for every i ∈
{0, . . . , n}. We assume that the variables that occur on the
right-hand side of a Horn clause also occur on the left-hand
side1. If n = 0, i.e., the left-hand side of the clause is always
true, we call the Horn clause a0 a fact.
Given a Horn theory T and a ground atom a, we say
that a can syntactically be derived from A w.r.t. T (written
T ⊢ a) if there exists a derivation for a from T , i.e., there
exists a sequence pi = b1, . . . , bl of ground atoms such that
bl = a and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l} there exists a substitution
σ and a Horn clause a1, . . . , an → a0 in T such that a0σ = bi
and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}
1This assumption can easily be relaxed for variables that are substi-
tuted only be cetrain “good” terms, where “good” means C-dominated
(see Section 3)
I(x) → I(hash(x)) I(x), I(y)→ I(〈x, y〉)
I(〈x, y〉) → I(x) I(〈x, y〉)→ I(y)
I(x), I(y) → I({x}
y
), I({x}
y
), I(y)→ I(x)
I(x), I(pub(y)) → I({|x|}
pub(y)), I({|x|}pub(y)), I(y)→ I(x)
I(x), I(y) → I(x⊕ y)
Figure 1: Intruder Rules.
with ajσ = bk. In what follows, we sometimes refer to bi by
pi(i) and to b1, . . . , bi by pi≤i. The length l of a derivation
pi is referred to by |pi|.
We call a sequence b1, . . . , bl of ground atoms an in-
complete syntactic derivation of a from T if bl = a and
T ∪ {b1, . . . , bi−1} ⊢ bi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , bl}.
Similarly, we write T ⊢⊕ a if there exists a derivation
of a from T modulo XOR, i.e., there exists a sequence
b1, . . . , bl of ground atoms such that bl ∼ a and for ev-
ery i ∈ {1, . . . , l} there exists a substitution σ and a Horn
clause a1, . . . , an → a0 in T such that a0σ ∼ bi and for
every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} with
ajσ ∼ bk. Incomplete derivations modulo XOR are defined
analogously to the syntactic case.
Given T and a, we call the problem of deciding whether
T ⊢ a (T ⊢⊕ a) is true, the deduction problem (modulo
XOR). In case T models a protocol and the intruder (as
described below), the fact that T ⊢⊕ a, with a = I(t), is not
true means that the term t is secret, i.e., the intruder cannot
get hold of t even when running an unbounded number of
sessions of the protocol and using algebraic properties of
the XOR operator.
Modeling Protocols by Horn theories
Following [2], we now illustrate how Horn theories can be
used to analyze cryptographic protocols, where, however,
we take the XOR operator into account. While here we con-
centrate on secrecy properties, authentication is discussed
in Section 5. As mentioned in the introduction, the Horn
theory approach allows us to analyze the security of proto-
cols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions and with no
bound on the message size in a fully automatic and sound
way. However, the algorithms are not guaranteed to termi-
nate and may produce false attacks.
A Horn theory for modeling protocols and the (Dolev-
Yao) intruder uses only the predicate I. The fact I(t) means
that the intruder may be able to obtain the term t. The
fundamental property is that if I(t) cannot be derived from
the set of clauses, then the protocol preserves the secrecy of
t. The Horn theory consists of three sets of Horn clauses:
the initial intruder facts, the intruder rules, and the pro-
tocol rules. The set of initial intruder facts represents the
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initial intruder knowledge, such as names of principals and
public keys. The clauses in this set are facts, e.g., I(a) (the
intruder knows the name a) and I(pub(ska)) (the intruder
knows the public key of a, with ska being the corresponding
private key). The set of intruder rules represents the intrud-
ers ability to derive new messages. For the cryptographic
primitives mentioned above, the set of intruder rules con-
sists of the clauses depicted in Figure 1. The last clause in
this figure will be called the ⊕-rule. It allows the intruder
to perform the XOR operation on arbitrary messages. The
set of protocol rules represents the actions performed in
the actual protocol. The ith protocol step of a principal
is described by a clause of the form I(r1), . . . , I(ri)→ I(si)
where the terms rj , j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, describe the (patterns of)
messages the principal has received in the previous i−1st
steps plus the (pattern of the) message in the ith step. The
term I(si) is the (pattern of) the ith output message of the
principal. Given a protocol P , we denote by TP the Horn
theory that comprises all three sets mentioned above.
Let us illustrate the above by a simple example protocol,
which we will use as a running example throughout this
paper. Applications of our approach to more complex pro-
tocols are presented in Section 6.2. We emphasize that the
kind of Horn theories outlined above are only an example
of how protocols and intruders can be modeled. As already
mentioned in the introduction, our methods applies to all
⊕-linear Horn theories.
Running example
We consider a protocol that was proposed in [7]. It is a
variant of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol in which
XOR is employed. The informal description of the protocol,
which we denote by PNSL⊕ , is as follows:
(1) A→ B : {|〈N,A〉|}pub(skB)
(2) B → A : {|〈M,N ⊕B〉|}pub(skA)
(3) A→ B : {|M |}pub(skB)
where N and M are nonces generated by A and B, respec-
tively. As noted in [7], this protocol is insecure; a similar
attack as the one on the original Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol can be mounted, where, however, now the algebraic
properties of XOR are exploited.
To illustrate how this protocol can be modeled in terms
of Horn theories, let P be a set of participant names and
H ⊆ P be the set of names of the honest participants. As
proved in [10], for the secrecy property it suffices to consider
the case P = {a, b} and H = {a} (for authentication three
participants are needed). In the following, ska, for a ∈ P,
denotes the private key of a, n(a, b) denotes the nonce sent
by a ∈ P to b ∈ P in message 1., and m(b, a) denotes the
nonce generated by b and sent to a in message 2.
The initial intruder knowledge is the set {I(a) | a ∈ P} ∪
{I(pub(ska)) | a ∈ P} ∪ {I(ska) | a ∈ P \ H} of facts. The
intruder rules are those depicted in Figure 1. The first step
of the protocol performed by an honest principal is modeled
by the facts:
I({|〈n(a, b), a〉|}pub(skb))
for a ∈ H, b ∈ P. Note that it is not necessary to model
messages sent by dishonest principals, since these are taken
care of by the actions that can be performed by the intruder.
The second step of the protocol performed by an honest
principal is modeled by the clauses:
I({|〈x, a〉|}pub(skb))→ I({|〈m(b, a), x⊕ b〉|}pub(ska)) (3)
for b ∈ H, a ∈ P. The third step of the protocol performed
by an honest principal is modeled by the clauses:
I({|〈y, n(a, b)⊕ b〉|}pub(ska))→ I({|y|}pub(skb)) (4)
for a ∈ H, b ∈ P. The set of Horn clauses defined above is
denoted by TPNSL⊕ . It is not hard to verify that we have
TPNSL⊕ ⊢⊕ m(b, a) for every a, b ∈ H. In fact, secrecy of the
nonces sent by an honest responder to an honest initiator
is not guaranteed by the protocol [7].
3 Dominated Derivations
In Section 4, we show how to reduce the deduction problem
modulo XOR to the one without XOR for ⊕-linear Horn
theories, introduced below. This reduction allows us to re-
duce the problem of checking secrecy for protocols that use
XOR to the case of protocols that do not use XOR. (The
authentication problem will be considered in Section 5.)
The latter problem can then be solved by tools that cannot
deal with XOR, such as ProVerif. The class of protocol and
intruder capabilities that we can handle this way is quite
large: It contains all protocol and intruder rules that are
⊕-linear.
In this section, we prove a proposition that will be the key
to the reduction. Before we can state the proposition, we
need to introduce ⊕-linear Horn theories and some further
terminology.
A term is ⊕-linear if for each of its subterms of the form
t⊕s, where t and s may be standard or non-standard terms,
it is true that t or s is ground. In other words, if a term t
contains a subterm of the form t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn with n ≥ 2, ti
standard for every i, and there exists i and j, i 6= j, such
that ti and tj are not ground, then t is not ⊕-linear. For
example, for variables x, y, z and a constant a, the term
t1ex = 〈a, a⊕ 〈x, y〉〉 is ⊕-linear, but the term t
2
ex = 〈a, a⊕
〈x, y〉 ⊕ z〉 is not. A Horn clause is called ⊕-linear if each
term occurring in the clause is ⊕-linear. A Horn theory is
⊕-linear if each clause in this theory, except for the ⊕-rule
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(see Fig. 1), is ⊕-linear. In particular, given a protocol P ,
the induced theory TP is ⊕-linear if the sets of protocol and
intruder rules, except for the ⊕-rule, are.
Our running example is an example of a protocol with
an ⊕-linear Horn theory (note that, in (3) and (4), b is
a constant); other examples are mentioned in Section 6.2.
Also, many intruder rules are ⊕-linear. In particular, all
those that do not contain the XOR symbol. For example,
in addition to the cryptographic primitives mentioned in
Figure 1, other primitives, such as various kinds of signa-
tures, encryption with prefix properties, and MACs have
⊕-linear intruder rules.
Besides ⊕-linearity, we also need a more fine-grained no-
tion: C-domination. Let C be a finite set of standard ⊕-
reduced ground terms such that C does not contain two el-
ements m,m′ with m 6= m′ and m ∼ m′. (For the efficiency
of our reduction (Section 4), it is important to keep C as
small as possible.) Let C⊕ = {t | there exist c1, . . . , cn ∈ C
such that t ∼ c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cn} be the ⊕-closure of C. Note
that 0 ∈ C⊕. Finally, let C˜ = {t | t ∼ t′ ∈ C, t standard}.
Now, a term is C-dominated if, for each of its subterms
of the form t ⊕ s, where t and s may be standard or non-
standard, it is true that t or s is in C⊕. For example, the
term t1ex from above is {a}-dominated, but is is not {b}-
dominated. The term t2ex is not {a}-dominated. A Horn
clause is C-dominated, if the terms occurring in this clause
are C-dominated; similarly for derivations. Finally, a Horn
theory T is C-dominated if each clause in T , except for
the ⊕-rule, is C-dominated. For example, we have that
the Horn theory TPNSL⊕ of our running example is {a, b}-
dominated. (Recall that P = {a, b}.)
C-dominated terms can also be characterized in terms of
what we call bad terms. We call a non-standard term t bad
(w.r.t. C), if t ∼ c ⊕ t1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ tn for c ∈ C⊕, pairwise ⊕-
distinct standard terms t1, . . . , tn /∈ C˜, and n > 1, where t
and t′ are ⊕-distinct if t 6∼ t′. A non-standard term which
is not bad is called good. The following lemma is easy to
see:
Lemma 1. An ⊕-reduced term is C-dominated iff it con-
tains no bad subterms.
There is an obvious connection between ⊕-linearity and
C-domination:
Lemma 2. For every ⊕-linear term/Horn theory/deriva-
tion there exists a finite set C of standard ⊕-reduced mes-
sages such that the term/Horn theory/derivation is C-dom-
inated.
The set C mentioned in the lemma could be chosen to
be the set of all ground standard terms occurring in the
term/Horn theory/derivation. However, C should be chosen
as small as possible in order to make the reduction presented
in Section 4 more efficient.
As mentioned, the following proposition is the key to our
reduction. The proposition states that C-dominated Horn
theories always allow for C-dominated derivations. Because
of Lemma 2, the proposition applies to all ⊕-linear Horn
theories.
Proposition 1. Let T be a C-dominated Horn theory and
b be a C-dominated fact. If T ⊢⊕ b, then there exists a C-
dominated derivation modulo XOR for b from T .
Before we present the proof of this proposition, we in-
troduce some terminology, which is also used in subsequent
sections, and sketch the idea of the proof. We write t ≃C t′
if t′ ∼ c⊕ t (or equivalently, c⊕ t′ ∼ t), for some c ∈ C⊕.
For the rest of this section we fix a derivation pi modulo
XOR for b from T . W.l.o.g. we may assume that each term
occurring in pi is in ⊕-reduced form and that each term in
a substitution applied in pi is in ⊕-reduced form as well.
The key definitions for the proof of Proposition 1 are the
following ones:
Definition 1. For a standard term t, the set C, and the
derivation pi, we define the type of t (w.r.t. pi and C),
written t˜, to be an ⊕-reduced element c of C⊕ such that
pi(i) ∼ I(c⊕ t) for some i, and for each j < i, it is not true
that pi(j) ∼ I(c′⊕ t) for some c′ ∈ C⊕. If such an i does not
exist, we say that the type of t is undefined.
Note that the type of a term is uniquely determined mod-
ulo AC and that equivalent terms (w.r.t. ∼) have equivalent
types.
In the following definition, we define an operator which
replaces standard terms in bad terms which are not in C˜
by their types. This turns a bad term into a good one.
To define the operator, we use the following notation. We
write ϕ⊕[x1, . . . , xn] for a term which is built only from ⊕,
elements of C˜, and the pairwise distinct variables x1, . . . , xn
such that each xi occurs exactly once in ϕ⊕[x1, . . . , xn]. An
example is ϕex⊕ [x1, x2, x3] = ((x1⊕x2)⊕(a⊕x3)), where a ∈
C˜. For messages t1, . . . , tn, we write ϕ⊕[t1, . . . , tn] for the
message obtained from ϕ⊕[x1, . . . , xn] by replacing every xi
by ti, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that each non-standard
term can be expressed in the form ϕ⊕[t1, . . . , tn] for some
ϕ⊕ as above and standard terms t1, . . . , tn /∈ C˜.
Definition 2. For a message t, we define ∆(t) as fol-
lows: If t is a bad term of the form ϕ⊕[t1, . . . , tn] for
some ϕ⊕ as above and standard terms t1, . . . , tn /∈ C˜, then
∆(t) = ϕ⊕[t˜1, . . . , t˜n]; ∆(t) is undefined, if one of those t˜i
is undefined. Otherwise (if t is good), we recursively apply
∆ to all direct subterms of t.
We will see (Lemma 10) that if t occurs in pi, then the types
of ti in the above definition are always defined. Note also
that ∆ is defined with respect to the given pi and C.
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Now, the main idea behind the proof of Proposition 1
is to apply ∆(·) to pi. We then show that (i) ∆(pi) is an
incomplete C-dominated derivation modulo XOR for b from
T and (ii) to obtain a complete derivation only C-dominated
terms are needed. The details of the proof are presented
next, by a series of lemmas, some of which are also used in
Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. The following lemma is easy to
show by structural induction on s:
Lemma 3. Let s and t be messages such that s is ⊕-
reduced, s contains a complete bad subterm s′, and s ∼ t.
Then, there exists a complete bad subterm t′ of t such that
t′ ∼ s′.
The following lemma, whose proof can be found in the
appendix, says that when substituting variables in a C-
dominated term, then complete bad terms that might have
been introduced by the substitution cannot be canceled out
by the C-dominated term.
Lemma 4. Let rθ ∼ t, for a term t, an ⊕-reduced substitu-
tion θ, and a C-dominated term r. Then, for each complete
bad subterm r′ of rθ there exists a complete (bad) subterm
t′ of t such that t′ ∼ r′.
We now show (see the appendix) that if an instance of a
C-dominated term contains a complete bad subterm, then
this term (up to ≃C) must be part of the substitution with
which the instance was obtained.
Lemma 5. Let θ be a ground substitution and s be a C-
dominated term. Assume that t is a complete bad subterm
of sθ. Then, there exists a variable x and a complete bad
subterm t′ of θ(x) such that t′ ≃C t.
The converse of Lemma 5 is also easy to show by struc-
tural induction on s.
Lemma 6. Let θ be a ground substitution and s be a C-
dominated term. If sθ is C-dominated, then so is θ(x) for
every x ∈ var(s).
Similarly to Lemma 5, we can prove the following lemma.
The main observation is that∆(c⊕t) ∼ c⊕∆(t), for c ∈ C⊕.
Lemma 7. ∆(sθ) ∼ s(∆θ), for a C-dominated term s and
a substitution θ.
Another basic and simple to prove property of ∆ is cap-
tured in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let s and t be terms such that s ∼ t. Then,
∆(s) ∼ ∆(t).
The following lemma says that if an instance of a C-
dominated Horn clause contains a complete bad subterm
on its right-hand side, then this term (up to ≃C) already
occurs on the left-hand side.
Lemma 9. Assume that p1(r1), . . . , pn(rn) → p0(s) is a
C-dominated Horn clause, θ is an ⊕-reduced ground sub-
stitution, w, u1, . . . , un are ⊕-reduced messages such that
w ∼ sθ and ui ∼ riθ, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If w′ is a complete bad subterm of w, then there exists
a complete bad subterm u′ of ui, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
such that u′ ≃C w
′.
Proof. Suppose that w′ is a complete bad subterm of w.
Because w ∼ sθ and w is ⊕-reduced, by Lemma 3, there
exists a complete bad subterm t of sθ with w′ ∼ t. By
Lemma 5, there exists a variable x ∈ var(s) and a complete
bad subterm t′ of θ(x) with t′ ≃C t. Because x, as a variable
of s, has to occur also in ri for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the term
t′ is a (not necessarily complete) subterm of riθ. Since ri is
C-dominated, there exists a complete subterm r′ of riθ with
r′ ≃C t′. Now, recall that t′ ≃C t and t ∼ w′. It follows
that r′ ≃C w
′. Furthermore, since w′ is bad, so is r′. Now,
by Lemma 4, there exists a complete bad subterm u′ of ui
such that u′ ≃C r′ ≃C w′.
The following lemma connects bad terms that occur in a
derivation with the types of their subterms.
Lemma 10. For every n ≥ 1, if pi(i) ∼ I(c ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
tn), for c ∈ C⊕ and pairwise ⊕-distinct standard terms
t1, . . . , tn /∈ C˜, then, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists
j ≤ i such that pi(j) ∼ I(t˜k ⊕ tk).
Proof. If n = 1, then I(t˜1 ⊕ t1) belongs to pi≤i, by the
definition of types.
Now, suppose that n > 1. In that case we will show, by
induction on i, something more than what is claimed in the
lemma: If t with t ∼ c⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn, c ∈ C⊕, and pairwise
⊕-distinct standard terms ti /∈ C˜, occurs as a complete bad
subterm in pi(i), then, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists
j ≤ i such that pi(j) ∼ I(t˜k ⊕ tk).
Suppose that t, as above, occurs as a complete bad sub-
term in pi(i).
If there exists t′ such that t′ ≃C t and t′ occurs in pi<i
as a complete subterm, then we are trivially done by the
induction hypothesis. (Note that t′ is bad since t is.) So,
suppose that such a t′ does not occur in pi<i as a complete
subterm. By Lemma 9, pi(i) cannot be obtained by a C-
dominated Horn clause. Thus, pi(i) is obtained by the ⊕-
rule, which means that pi(i) = I(u) with u ∼ s ⊕ r for
some I(s) and I(r) occurring in pi<i. We may assume that
s ∼ d⊕ s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sp, with d ∈ C⊕, and pairwise ⊕-distinct
⊕-reduced standard terms s1, . . . , sp /∈ C˜, and r ∼ e⊕ r1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ rq, with e ∈ C⊕, and pairwise ⊕-distinct ⊕-reduced
standard terms r1, . . . , rq /∈ C˜.
According to our assumption, neither s nor r contains
a complete subterm t′ with t′ ≃C t. In particular, neither
s nor r contains t′ with t′ ∼ t. So, since pi(i) ∼ I(s ⊕ r)
contains t as a complete subterm, it must be the case that
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t ∼ s ⊕ r. Now, with t ∼ c ⊕ t1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ tn, as above,
and k ∈ {1, . . . , n} it follows that either sl ∼ tk or rl ∼
tk, for some l. Suppose that the former case holds (the
argument is similar for the latter case). If p > 1 (and thus
s is a bad term), then, by the induction hypothesis, we know
that there exists j < i such that pi(j) ∼ I(s˜l ⊕ sl). Since
tk ∼ sl, we have that t˜k ∼ s˜l, and hence, pi(j) ∼ I(t˜k ⊕ tk).
Otherwise, s ∼ d⊕ tk, and hence, by the definition of types,
there exists j < i with pi(j) ∼ I(t˜k ⊕ tk).
The following lemma is the key in proving that ∆(pi) is
an incomplete derivation modulo XOR.
Lemma 11. For every i ≤ |pi|, if I(c ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn),
for some c ∈ C⊕ and pairwise ⊕-distinct standard terms
t1, . . . , tn /∈ C˜, belongs to pi<i, then there is a derivation for
I(c⊕ t˜1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t˜n) from ∆(pi<i) modulo XOR.
Proof. If n = 0 or n > 1, then I(c⊕ t˜1⊕· · ·⊕ t˜n) ∼ I(∆(c⊕
t1⊕· · ·⊕tn)) by the definition of∆, and hence, I(c⊕t˜1⊕· · ·⊕
t˜n) can be derived from ∆(pi<i). So suppose that n = 1.
Since we have I(c ⊕ t1) in pi<i, then, by the definition of
types, we also have I(t˜1⊕t1) in pi<i. Thus, by the definition
of ∆, I(c ⊕∆(t1)) and I(t˜1 ⊕ ∆(t1)) are in ∆(pi<i). From
these one obtains I(c⊕ t˜1) by applying the ⊕-rule.
Now, we can finish the proof of Proposition 1. First, note
that every non-standard message in ∆(pi) is C-dominated.
This immediately follows from the definition of ∆. We will
now show (*): For each i ∈ {1, . . . , |pi|}, ∆(pi(i)) can be de-
rived from∆(pi<i) modulo XOR by using only C-dominated
terms. This then completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that we assume that pi is ⊕-reduced and that in
this derivation we use only ⊕-reduced substitutions. To
prove (*), we consider two cases:
Case 1. pi(i) is obtained from pi<i using a C-dominated Horn
clause R = (p1(s1), . . . , pn(sn) → p0(s0)) of T : Then there
exists a ⊕-reduced substitution θ such that pi(i) ∼ p0(s0θ)
and the atoms p1(s1θ), . . . , pn(snθ) occur in pi<i modulo
XOR. Thus, by Lemma 8, p1(∆(s1θ)), . . . , pn(∆(snθ)) oc-
cur in ∆(pi<i) modulo XOR. Now, by Lemma 7, we have
that ∆(siθ) ∼ si(∆θ), for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Thus, by
applying R with the substitution∆(θ), we obtain∆(pi(i)) ∼
∆(s0θ) ∼ s0(∆(θ)).
Case 2. pi(i) is obtained by the ⊕-rule: Hence, there are two
atoms I(s) and I(r) in pi<i such that pi(i) ∼ I(s⊕r). We may
assume that s ∼ c⊕s1⊕· · ·⊕sm, with c ∈ C⊕, and pairwise
⊕-distinct ⊕-reduced standard terms s1, . . . , sm /∈ C˜, and
r ∼ d⊕ r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rl, with d ∈ C⊕, and pairwise ⊕-distinct
⊕-reduced standard terms r1, . . . , rl /∈ C˜. Let {t1, . . . , tn} =
(S \R)∪ (R\S), for S = {s1, . . . , sm} and R = {r1, . . . , rl}.
Then, pi(i) ∼ I(s⊕ r) ∼ I(c⊕ d⊕ t1⊕ · · · ⊕ tn). By Lemma
11, we know that I(c⊕ s˜1⊕· · ·⊕ s˜m) and I(d⊕ r˜1⊕· · ·⊕ r˜l)
can be derived from∆(pi<i) modulo XOR. Hence, I(t
′) with
t′ = c⊕d⊕ t˜1⊕· · ·⊕ t˜n can be derived from ∆(pi<i) as well
(by applying the ⊕-rule). Now, let us consider two cases:
(a) n = 0 or n > 1: In this case, we have that ∆(pi(i)) ∼
I(t′), and hence, ∆(pi(i)) can be derived from ∆(pi<i).
(b) n = 1: Because I(c⊕s1⊕· · ·⊕sm) and I(d⊕r1⊕· · ·⊕rl)
occur in pi<i modulo XOR, by Lemma 10, I(t˜1⊕ t1) oc-
curs in pi<i modulo XOR as well. Thus, by Lemma 8,
I(t˜1 ⊕ ∆(t1)) occurs in ∆(pi<i) modulo XOR. Now,
because I(t′), with t′ = c ⊕ d ⊕ t˜1, can be derived
from ∆(pi<i) modulo XOR, so can I(c ⊕ d ⊕∆(t1)) ∼
∆(pi(i)).
4 The Reduction
In this section, we show how the deduction problem mod-
ulo XOR can be reduced to the deduction problem without
XOR for C-dominated theories. More precisely, for a C-
dominated theory T , we show how to effectively construct
a Horn theory T+ such that a (C-dominated) fact can be
derived from T modulo XOR iff it can be derived from T+
in a syntactic derivation, where XOR is considered to be
a function symbol without any algebraic properties. As
mentioned, the syntactic deduction problem, and hence,
the problem of checking secrecy for cryptographic proto-
cols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions, can then be
solved by tools, such as ProVerif, which cannot deal with
the algebraic properties of XOR.
In the remainder of this section, let T be a C-dominated
theory. In what follows, we will first define the reduction
function, which turns T into T+, and state the main re-
sult (Section 4.1), namely that the reduction is sound and
complete as stated above. Before proving this result in Sec-
tion 4.3, we illustrate the reduction function by our running
example (Section 4.2).
4.1 The Reduction Function
The reduction function uses an operator p·q, which turns
terms into what we call normal form, and a set Σ(t) of
substitutions associated with the term t. We first define
this operator and the set Σ(t). The operator p·q is defined
w.r.t. a linear ordering <
C
on C, which we fix once and for
all.
Definition 3. For a C-dominated term t, we define the
normal form of t, denoted by ptq, recursively as follows:
• If t is a variable, then ptq = t.
• If t = f(t1, . . . , tn) is standard, then ptq =
f(pt1q, . . . , ptnq).
• If t ∈ C⊕ is non-standard and t ∼ c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cn, for
some pairwise ⊕-distinct c1, . . . , cn ∈ C, n > 1, such
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that c1 <C · · · <C cn, then ptq = pc1q ⊕ (pc2q ⊕ (· · · ⊕
pcnq) · · · ).
• If t is non-standard and t ∼ c ⊕ t′, for some c ∈ C⊕,
c 6∼ 0, and standard t′ not in C˜, then ptq = pcq⊕ pt′q.
We say that a term t is in normal form, if t = ptq. A
substitution θ is in normal form, if θ(x) is in normal form
for each variable x in the domain of θ.
It is easy to see that ptq = psq for C-dominated terms
t and s iff t ∼ s, and that ptq is ⊕-reduced for any t. By
C⊕norm, we denote the set {pcq | c ∈ C
⊕}. Clearly, this set is
finite and computable in exponential time in the size of C.
To define the set Σ(t) of substitutions, we need the notion
of fragile subterms. For a C-dominated term t, the set of
fragile subterms of t, denoted by F(t), is F(t) = {s | s is
a non-ground, standard term which occurs as a subterm of
t in the form t′ ⊕ s or s ⊕ t′ for some t′}. For example,
F((a⊕ 〈x, b〉)⊕ b) = {〈x, b〉}.
We are now ready to define the (finite and effectively com-
putable) set Σ(t) of substitutions for a C-dominated term
t. The main property of this set is the following: For every
C-dominated, ground substitution θ in normal form, there
exists a substitution σ ∈ Σ(t) and a substitution θ′ such
that ptθq = (ptσq)θ′. In other words, the substitutions
in Σ(t) yield all relevant instances of t. All ground, nor-
malized instances are syntactic instances of those instances.
This resembles the finite variant property of XOR [11] men-
tioned in the introduction. However, our construction of
Σ(t) is tailored and optimized towards C-dominated terms
and substitutions. More importantly, we obtain a stronger
property in the sense that the equality—ptθq = (ptσq)θ′—
is syntactic equality, not only equality modulo AC; the no-
tion of C-domination, which we introduced here, is crucial
in order to obtain this property. Having syntactic equality
is important for our reduction in order to get rid of algebraic
properties completely.
Definition 4. Let t be a C-dominated term. We define a
family of substitutions Σ(t) as follows. The domain of every
substitution in Σ(t) is the set of all variables which occur
in some s ∈ F(t). Now, σ ∈ Σ, if for each x ∈ dom(σ) one
of the following cases holds:
(i) σ(x) = x,
(ii) x ∈ F(t) and σ(x) = c⊕ x, for some c ∈ C⊕norm, c 6= 0,
(iii) there exists s ∈ F(t) with x ∈ var(s) and a C-
dominated substitution θ in normal form such that
sθ ∈ C⊕ and σ(x) = θ(x).
To illustrate the definition and the property mentioned
above, consider, as an example, t = c ⊕ x and the substi-
tution θ(x) = d ⊕ m, with d ∈ C⊕norm and a C-dominated,
standard term m /∈ C⊕norm in normal form. In this case, we
can choose σ(x) = d⊕ x according to (ii). With θ′(x) = m,
we obtain ptθq = pc ⊕ dq ⊕ m = (ptσq)θ′. If θ(x) were
d ∈ C⊕norm, then (iii) would be applied.
We can show (see the appendix):
Lemma 12. For a C-dominated term t, the set Σ(t) can be
computed in exponential time in the size of t.
We are now ready to define the reduction function which
turns T into T+. The Horn theory T+ is given in Fig. 2.
With the results shown above, it is clear that T+ can be
constructed in exponential time from T . The Horn clauses
in (6)–(9) simulate the ⊕-rule in case the terms we consider
are C-dominated. The other rules in T are simulated by
the rules in (5), which are constructed in such a way that
they allow us to produce messages in normal form for input
messages in normal form.
We can now state the main theorem of this paper. This
theorem states that a message (a secret) can be derived
from T using derivations modulo XOR if and only if it can
be derived from T+ using only syntactic derivations, i.e.,
no algebraic properties of XOR are taken into account. As
mentioned, this allows to reduce the problem of verifying
secrecy for cryptographic protocols with XOR, to the XOR-
free case. The latter problem can then be handled by tools,
such as ProVerif, which otherwise could not deal with XOR.
Theorem 1. For a C-dominated Horn theory T and C-
dominated message b in normal form, we have: T ⊢⊕ b if
and only if T+ ⊢ b.
Before we prove this theorem, we illustrate the reduction
by our running example.
4.2 Example
Consider the Horn theory TPNSL⊕ of our running example.
As mentioned in Section 3, this Horn theory is C-dominated
for C = {a, b}. In what follows, we illustrate how T+PNSL⊕
looks like, where the elements of C are ordered as a <C b.
First, consider the instances of Horn clauses of TPNSL⊕
given by (5). Only the Horn clauses in (3) have fragile
subterms. All other Horn clauses have only one instance
in T+PNSL⊕
: the rule itself. This is because for such Horn
clauses Σ(·) contains only one substitution, the identity.
The Horn clause in (3) has one fragile subterm, namely
x. Hence, the domain of every substitution in the corre-
sponding Σ-set is {x}, and according to Definition 4, this
set contains the following eight substitutions: item (i) gives
σ1 = {x/x}; item (ii) gives σ2 = {a⊕x/x}, σ3 = {b⊕x/x},
and σ4 = {(a ⊕ b) ⊕ x/x}; item (iii) gives σ5 = {0/x},
σ6 = {a/x}, σ7 = {b/x}, and σ8 = {a ⊕ b/x}. For each
of these substitutions we obtain an instance of (3). For
example, σ4 yields
I({|〈(a⊕ b)⊕ x, a〉|}pub(skb))→ I({|〈m(b, a), a⊕ x〉|}pub(ska)).
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pr1σq, . . . , prnσq → pr0σq for each C-dominated rule r1, . . . , rn → r0 of T and each σ ∈ Σ(〈r0, . . . , rn〉). (5)
I(c), I(c′)→ I(pc⊕ c′q) for each c, c′ ∈ C⊕norm (6)
I(c), I(x)→ I(c⊕ x) for each c ∈ C⊕norm (7)
I(c), I(c′ ⊕ x)→ I(pc⊕ c′q⊕ x) for each c, c′ ∈ C⊕norm (8)
I(c⊕ x), I(c′ ⊕ x)→ I(pc⊕ c′q) for each c, c′ ∈ C⊕norm (9)
Figure 2: Rules of the theory T+. We use the convention that I(0⊕ x) stands for I(x).
Now, consider the Horn clauses induced by (6)–(9). For
example, the set of Horn clauses (8) contains among others:
I(a⊕b), I(b⊕x)→ I(a⊕x) and I(b), I(a⊕x)→ I((a⊕b)⊕x).
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
In what follows, let T be a C-dominated Horn theory and
b be a C-dominated message in normal form. Note that
pbq = b. The following lemma proves that our reduction is
sound, i.e., that T+ ⊢ b implies T ⊢⊕ b.
Lemma 13. If pi is a syntactic derivation for b from T+,
then pi is a derivation for b from T modulo XOR.
Proof. Let pi be a syntactic derivation for b from T+. To
prove the lemma it suffices to prove that each pi(i) can be
obtained by a derivation modulo XOR from T and pi<i. If
pi(i) is obtained from pi(j) and pi(k) for j, k < i, using one
of the Horn clauses (6)–(9), then we can apply the ⊕-rule
with pi(j) and pi(k) to obtain pi(j)⊕ pi(i) ∼ pi(i).
Now, suppose that pi(i) is obtained using a Horn clause
in (5) of the form pr1σq, . . . , prnσq → pr0σq for some Horn
clause (r1, . . . , rn → r0) ∈ T and some σ ∈ Σ(〈r0, . . . , rn〉).
Hence, there exists a substitution θ and, for each k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, there exists j < i such that pi(j) = prkσqθ ∼
(rkσ)θ = rk(σθ). So, we can use the rule r1, . . . , rn → r0
to obtain r0(σθ) = (r0σ)θ ∼ pr0σqθ = pi(i). Note that
ptq ∼ t and if t ∼ t′, then tσ ∼ t′σ for all terms t, t′ and
substitutions σ.
To prove the completeness of our reduction, i.e., that
T ⊢⊕ b implies T+ ⊢ b, we first prove the property of Σ(t)
mentioned before Definition 4. For this, we need the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 5. Let t be a C-dominated term and θ be
a C-dominated, ground substitution in normal form with
dom(θ) = var(t). Let σ = σ(t, θ) be the substitution de-
fined as follows. The domain of σ is the set of all variables
that occur in some s ∈ F(t). Let x be such a variable.
We define σ(x) according to the following conditions, which
have decreasing priority:
(a) If there exists s ∈ F(t) with x ∈ var(s) such that sθ ∈
C⊕, then σ(x) = θ(x).
(b) Otherwise, if x ∈ F(t) and θ(x) = c⊕s′, for c ∈ C⊕ and
some standard term s′ not in C⊕, then σ(x) = c ⊕ x.
(Note that c 6= 0 since θ(x) is in normal form.)
(c) Otherwise, σ(x) = x. (Note that in this case we know
that θ(x) is some standard term not in C⊕ if x ∈ F(t).)
Equipped with this definition, we show (see the ap-
pendix) the property of Σ(t) mentioned before Definition 4.
Lemma 14. Let t be a C-dominated term and θ be a
C-dominated, ground substitution in normal form with
dom(θ) = var(t). Then, σ = σ(t, θ) ∈ Σ(t) and there exists
a substitution θ′ such that θ = σθ′, i.e., θ(x) = σ(x)θ′ for
every x ∈ dom(θ), and pt′θq = pt′σqθ′ for every subterm t′
of t.
We can now show the completeness of our reduction.
Lemma 15. If pi is a C-dominated derivation for b from T
modulo XOR, then ppiq is a syntactic derivation for b from
T+.
Proof. We show that every ppi(i)q can be derived syntacti-
cally from T+ and ppi<iq. Two cases are distinguished:
Case 1: pi(i) is obtained from pi(j) = I(t) and pi(k) = I(s),
for j, k < i, using the⊕-rule. In that case pi(i) ∼ I(t⊕s). By
assumption t, s, and t⊕s are C-dominated, and hence, ptq,
psq, pt⊕sq are either normalized standard terms not in C⊕,
terms in C⊕norm, or terms of the form c⊕u for c ∈ C
⊕
norm and a
normalized standard term u /∈ C⊕, respectively. However, it
is not the case that ptq = c⊕u or ptq = u and psq = u′ /∈ C⊕
or psq = c′ ⊕ u′ with u 6= u′ since otherwise pt⊕ sq would
not be C-dominated. Now, it is easy to see that ⊕-rule can
be simulated by one of the Horn clauses (6)–(9).
Case 2: pi(i) is obtained using some C-dominated rule
(r1, . . . , rn → r0) ∈ T and a ground substitution θ. Since
pi is C-dominated, by Lemma 6 and 3 we may assume that
θ is C-dominated. Since pi is a derivation modulo XOR,
we may also assume that θ is in normal form. We have
that pi(i) ∼ r0θ and there exist j1, . . . , jn < i such that
pi(jk) ∼ rkθ, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let σ = σ(〈r0, . . . , rn〉, θ) and let θ
′ be as specified in
Lemma 14. By Lemma 14, σ ∈ Σ(〈r0, . . . , rn〉). Now, to
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obtain ppi(i)q, we can use the rule ρ = (pr1σq, . . . , prnσq →
pr0σq) ∈ T+ with the substitution θ′. In fact, by
Lemma 14, we have that prkσqθ
′ = prkθq = ppi(jk)q for all
k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, where j0 = 0. (Recall that for C-dominated
terms s and t with s ∼ t, we have that psq = ptq.)
Now, from the above lemma and Proposition 1 it imme-
diately follows that T ⊢⊕ b implies T+ ⊢ b.
5 Authentication
In the previous section, we showed how to reduce the deriva-
tion problem modulo XOR for C-dominated Horn theories
to the syntactic derivation problem. While the derivation
problem corresponds to the secrecy problem for crypto-
graphic protocols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions,
in this section, we will see that it is not hard to extend our
result to authentication properties.
Authentication as Correspondence Assertions
Authentication properties are often expressed as correspon-
dence assertions of the form end(x)→ begin(x) where x de-
scribes the parameters on which the begin and end events
should agree. This correspondence should be read as fol-
lows: If event end(x) has occurred, then also event begin(x).
For example, end(a, b, n) → begin(a, b, n) could be inter-
preted as: If b thinks to have finished a run of a protocol
with a in which the nonce n was used (in this case event
end(a, b, n) occurred), then a has actually run a protocol
with b in which n was used (in this case event begin(a, b, n)
occurred). To check such correspondence assertions in the
Horn theory based approach, roughly speaking, the proto-
col rules are augmented with atoms representing events of
the form begin(x) and end(x) (see, e.g., [3] for details).
For our running example, this is illustrated in Figure 3.
In (13), the end event indicates that b believes to have
talked to a and the nonce m(b, a, sid, x) was used in the
interaction, where x is the nonce b believes to have received
from a and sid is a session identifier. The parameters x
and sid are added to the term representing the nonce in
order to make the analysis more precise. In particular, the
session identifier is added in order to make the correspon-
dence stronger: The events should not only correspond on
the names and the nonces used in the protocol run, but
also on the session identifiers. Note that without the ses-
sion identifier, correspondence of sessions would otherwise
not be guaranteed since in the Horn theory based approach
new protocol runs do not necessarily use completely fresh
nonces. The begin event in (12) indicates that a just re-
ceived the response from b and now outputs her response
to b, where the begin event contains the nonce received from
b.
We note that, strictly speaking, the Horn theory depicted
in Figure 3 falls out of the class of Horn theories that we
allow, not because of ⊕-linearity but because of the fact
that the variable sid occurs on the right-hand side of a
Horn clause but not on the left-hand side (see (10) and
(11)). However, as we noted in Section 2, this assumption
can easily be relaxed for variables that are supposed to be
substituted only by C-dominated terms, which is the case
for session identifiers.
Now, let T be a Horn theory model of a protocol and an
intruder, i.e., T consists of a set of protocol rules (such as
those in Figure 3), a set of initial intruder facts, and a set of
intruder rules. Following Blanchet [3], we say that a (non-
injective) correspondence assertion of the form end(x) →
begin(x) is satisfied by T if
for every finite set of messages B and every mes-
sage m0 /∈ B̂, it holds that T ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈
B}6 ⊢⊕ end(m0),
(14)
where B̂ = {t | there exists t′ ∈ B and t ∼ t′}. In [3],
this formulation (more precisely, a syntactic version, i.e.,
the XOR-free version) is somewhat implicit in a theorem
which reduces correspondence assertions in process calculus
to Horn theories. Blanchet then proposes a method for
proving the syntactic version of (14) using ProVerif.
Extending Our Reduction to Correspondence
Assertions
The following theorem extends our reduction presented in
Section 4 to the problem of solving (14) with XOR. In fact,
we show that if in (14) the (C-dominated) Horn theory T is
replaced by T+ (i.e., we can use the same reduction function
as in Section 4), then derivation modulo XOR ( ⊢⊕ ) can
be replaced by syntactic derivation ( ⊢ ). Now, the latter
problem (the syntactic version of (14)) can be solved using
ProVerif. Formally, we can prove:
Theorem 2. Let T be a C-dominated Horn theory. Then,
(14) holds iff for every finite set of messages B and ev-
ery message m0 /∈ B, it holds that T+ ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈
B}6 ⊢ end(m0).
The proof of this theorem requires some slight extension
of Proposition 1, stated below, in which an injective version
of ∆ is used, i.e., t 6∼ t′ should imply that ∆(t) 6∼ ∆(t′).
This is needed to guarantee that if m0 /∈ B̂, then ∆(m0) /∈
∆̂(B).
This can be achieved by fixing an injective function γ
which takes a term to some term built from 0 and 〈·, ·〉 (or
any other function which the intruder can apply). We also
add the fresh constant c0 to the intruders knowledge. Now,
for a bad term t = c ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn, we define ∆(t) =
c ⊕ t˜1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t˜n ⊕ {γ(t)}c0 . The important property of
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I({n(a, b, sid), a}pub(kb)) for every a ∈ H, b ∈ P (10)
I({x, a}pub(kb)) → I({m(b, a, sid , x), x ⊕ b}pub(ka)) for every b ∈ H, a ∈ P (11)
begin(a, b, y), I({y, n(a, b, sid)⊕ b}pub(ka)) → I({y}pub(kb)) for every a ∈ H, b ∈ P (12)
I({(x, a)}pub(kb)), I({m(b, a, sid , x)}pub(kb)) → end(a, b,m(b, a, sid , x)) for every b ∈ H, a ∈ P (13)
Figure 3: Rules for authentication (sid is a variable intended to range over session identifiers).
{γ(t)}c0 is that the intruder can derive this message and
that it is unique for every term t.
Proposition 2. Let T be a C-dominated Horn theory, B
be a finite set of facts, and a be a fact. If T ∪ B ⊢⊕ a,
then there exists a C-dominated derivation for ∆(a) from
T ∪∆(B) modulo XOR.
The proof of this proposition is very similar to the one of
Proposition 1. Only minor modifications are necessary.
Now, to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to show that the fol-
lowing conditions are equivalent, for a C-dominated theory
T :
(i) there exist a finite set of messages B and a mes-
sage m0 /∈ B̂ such that T ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈
B} ⊢⊕ end(m0)
(ii) there exist a finite set of C-dominated messages B
and a C-dominated message m0 /∈ B̂ such that T ∪
{begin(m) | m ∈ B} ⊢⊕ end(m0).
(iii) there exist a finite set of C-dominated messages B
and a C-dominated message m0 /∈ B such that T+ ∪
{begin(m) | m ∈ B} ⊢ end(m0).
(iv) there exist a finite set of messages B and a message
m0 /∈ B such that T
+ ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈ B} ⊢
end(m0).
Proof. The implication (i)⇒(ii) follows from Proposition 2
and by the fact that ∆ is injective; (ii)⇒(iii) is given by
Theorem 1 (we use the fact that T ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈ B}
is C-dominated and the fact that (T ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈
B})+ = T+ ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈ pBq} ); (iii)⇒(iv) is trivial;
finally, (iv)⇒(i) is given by Lemma 13.
6 Implementation and Experiments
We have implemented our reduction, and together with
ProVerif, tested it on a set of protocols which employ the
XOR operator (see [17] for the implementation). In this
section, we report on our implementation and the experi-
mental results.
6.1 Implementation
We have implemented our reduction function in SWI prolog
(version 5.6.14). Our implementation essentially takes a
Horn theory as input. More precisely, the input consists
of (1) a declaration of all the functor symbols used in the
protocol and by the intruder, (2) the initial intruder facts
as well as the protocol and intruder rules, except for the
⊕-rule, which is assumed implicitly, (3) a statement which
defines a secrecy or authentication goal. Moreover, options
that are handed over to ProVerif may be added.
Our implementation then first checks whether the given
Horn theory, say T , (part (2) of the input) is ⊕-linear. If
it is not, an error message is returned. If it is, a set C is
computed such that the Horn theory is C-dominated. Recall
that such a set always exists if the Horn theory is ⊕-linear.
It is important to keep C as small as possible, in order for
the reduction to be more efficient. Once C is computed, the
reduction function as described in Section 4 is applied to
T , i.e., T+ is computed. Now, T+ together with the rest of
the original input is passed on to ProVerif. This tool then
does the rest of the work, i.e., it checks the goals for T+.
This is possible since, due the reduction, the XOR operator
in T+ can now be considered to be an operator without any
algebraic properties.
Our implementation does not follow the construction of
the reduction function described in Section 4 precisely, in
order to produce an output that is optimized for ProVerif
(but still equivalent): a) While terms of the form c ⊕ t,
with c ∈ C⊕, t /∈ C⊕ are represented by xor(c, t), terms
a⊕ b ∈ C⊕norm are represented by xx(a, b). This representa-
tion prevents some unnecessary unifications between terms.
However, it is easy to see that with this representation,
the proofs of soundness and completeness of our reduction
still go through. The basic reason is that terms in C⊕norm
can be seen as constants. b) For the Horn clauses in Fig-
ure 2, (6)–(9), we do not produce copies for every choice
of c, c′ ∈ C⊕norm. Instead, we use a more compact repre-
sentation by introducing auxiliary predicate symbols. For
example, the family of Horn clauses in (8) is represented
as follows: xtab(x, y, z), I(y), I(xor(x, t)) → I(xor(z, t)),
where the facts xtab(c, c′, pc ⊕ c′q) for every c, c′ ∈ C⊕norm
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protocol correct reduction time ProVerif time
NSL⊕ no 0.02s 0.006s
NSL⊕-fix yes 0.04s 0.09s
NSL⊕-auth-A no 0.03s 0.16s
NSL⊕-auth-A-fix yes 0.03s 0.02s
NSL⊕-auth-B yes 0.04s 0.5s
SK3 yes 0.05s 0.3s
RA no 0.05s 0.17s
RA-fix yes 0.05s 0.27s
CCA-0 no 0.15s 109s
CCA-1A yes 0.06s 0.7s
CCA-1B yes 0.07s 1.3s
CCA-2B yes 0.14s 7.1s
CCA-2C yes 0.15s 58.0s
CCA-2E yes 0.07s 1.42s
Figure 4: Experimental Results.
are added to the Horn theory given to ProVerif.
6.2 Experiments
We applied our method to a set of (⊕-linear) protocols. The
results, obtained by running our implementation on a 2,4
Ghz Intel CoreTM 2 Duo E6700 processor with 2GB RAM,
are depicted in Figure 4, where we list both the time of the
reduction and the time ProVerif needed for the analysis of
the output of the reduction. We note that except for certain
versions of the CCA protocol, the other protocols listed in
Figure 4 are out of the scope of the implementation in [14],
the only other implementation that we know of for cryp-
tographic protocol analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of
sessions that takes XOR into account. As mentioned in the
introduction, the method in [14] is especially tailored to the
CCA protocol. It can only deal with symmetric encryption
and the XOR operator, but, for example, cannot deal with
protocols that use public-key encryption or pairing. Let us
discuss the protocols and settings that we analyzed in more
detail.
By NSL⊕ we denote our running example. Since there is
an attack on this protocol, we also propose a fix NSL⊕-fix
in which the message {|〈M,N ⊕B〉|}pub(skA) is replaced by
{|〈M,h(〈N,M〉)⊕B〉|}pub(skA) for a hash function h(·). We
analyze both authentication and secrecy properties for these
(⊕-linear) protocols.
The (⊕-linear) protocol SK3 [18] is a key distribution pro-
tocol for smart cards, which uses the XOR operator. RA de-
notes an (⊕-linear) group protocol for key distribution [6].
Since there is a known attack on this protocol, we proposed
a fix: a message kA,B⊕h(〈key(A), N〉) sent by the key distri-
bution server to A is replaced by kA,B⊕h(〈key(A), 〈N,B〉〉).
CCA stands for Common Cryptographic Architecture
(CCA) API [1] as implemented on the hardware security
module IBM 4758 (an IBM cryptographic coprocessor).
The CCA API is used in ATMs and mainframe comput-
ers of many banks to carry out PIN verification requests.
It accepts a set of commands, which can be seen as receive-
send-actions, and hence, as cryptographic protocols. The
only key stored in the security module is the master key
km. All other keys are kept outside of the module in the
form {k}km⊕type , where type ∈ {data, imp, exp, pin} de-
notes the type of the key, where each type is some fixed con-
stant. The commands of the CCA API include the follow-
ing: Commands for encrypting/decrypting data using data
keys. Commands to export/import a key to/from another
security module. This is done by encrypting/decrypting the
key by a key-encryption-key.
In Figure 5, we model the most important commands
of the CCA API (see also [14]) in terms of Horn clauses.
(Encipher) and (Decipher) are used to encrypt/decrypt
data by data keys. (KeyExport) is used to export a key
to another security module by encrypting it under a key-
encryption-key, with (KeyImport) being the correspond-
ing import command. The problem is to make the same
key-encryption-key available in different security modules.
This is done by a secret sharing scheme using the com-
mands (KeyPartImp-First)–(KeyPartImp-Last), where kp
is a type (a constant) which stands for “key part”, kek is
obtained as k1⊕ k2⊕ k3, and each ki, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, }, is sup-
posed to be known by only one individual. (KeyTranslate)
is used to encrypt a key under a different key-encryption-
key.
We note that some of the Horn clauses in Figure 5,
namely (KeyPartImp-Middle) and (KeyPartImp-Last), are
not linear. Fortunately, one can apply a standard unfolding
technique for Horn clauses together with straightforward
simplifications to obtain an equivalent Horn theory with
only ⊕-linear rules.
There are several known attacks on the CCA API, which
concern the key-part-import process. One attack is by Bond
[5]. As a result of this attack the intruder is able to obtain
PINs for each account number by performing data encryp-
tion on the security module. A stronger attack was found
by IBM and is presented in [8] where the intruder can ob-
tain a PIN derivation key, and hence, can obtain PINs even
without interacting with the security module. However,
the IBM attack depends on key conjuring [14], and hence,
is harder to carry out. Using our implementation (together
with ProVerif) and the configuration denoted by CCA-0 in
Figure 4, we found a new attack which achieves the same as
the IBM attack, but is more efficient as it does not depend
on key conjuring. Our attack is presented at the end of this
section.
In response to the attacks reported in [5], IBM proposed
two recommendations.
Recommendation 1. As mentioned, the attacks exploit
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I(x), I({k}km⊕data) → I({x}k) (Encipher)
I({x}k), I({k}km⊕data) → I(x) (Decipher)
I({k}km⊕type), I(type), I({kek}km⊕exp) → I({k}kek⊕type) (KeyExport)
I({k}kek⊕type), I(type), I({kek}km⊕imp) → I({k}km⊕type) (KeyImport)
I(k1), I(type) → I({k1}km⊕kp⊕type) (KeyPartImp-First)
I(k2), I({x}km⊕kp⊕type), I(type) → I({x⊕ k2}km⊕kp⊕type) (KeyPartImp-Middle)
I(k3), I({y}km⊕kp⊕type), I(type) → I({y ⊕ k3}km⊕type) (KeyPartImp-Last)
I({k}kek1⊕type), I(type), I({kek1}km⊕imp), I({kek2}km⊕exp) → I({k}kek2⊕type) (KeyTranslate)
Figure 5: CCA API , where km denotes a constant (the key master stored in the cryptographic coprocessor), type is a
constant that ranges over the constants in {data, imp, exp, pin}, and all other symbols (x, y, k, ...) are variables.
problems in the key-part-import process. To prevent these
problems, one IBM recommendation is to replace this part
by a public-key setting. However, as shown in [14], fur-
ther access control mechanisms are needed, which essen-
tially restrict the kind of commands certain roles may per-
form. Two cases, which correspond to two different roles,
are considered, and are denoted CCA-1A and CCA-1B in
Figure 4. We note that the Horn theories that correspond
to these cases are ⊕-linear, and hence, our tool can be ap-
plied directly, no changes are necessary; not even the trans-
formations mentioned above. Since public-key encryption
(and pairing) cannot be directly handled by the tool pre-
sented by Cortier et al. [14], Cortier et al. had to modify
the protocol in an ad hoc way, which is not guaranteed to
yield an equivalent protocol. This is also why the runtimes
of the tools cannot be compared directly.
Recommendation 2. Here additional access control mecha-
nisms are assumed which ensure that no single role is able
to mount an attack. We analyzed exactly the same subsets
of commands as the ones in [14]. These cases are denoted
CCA-2B, -2C, and -2E in Figure 4, following the notation in
[14]. The runtimes obtained in [14] are comparable to ours:
333s for CCA-2B, 58s for -2C, and 0.03s for -2E.
Our Attack. As we noted before, our tool found an at-
tack which—according to our knowledge—has not been dis-
covered before. This attack uses the same assumptions as
Bond’s attack in terms of the role played by the intruder
and his knowledge. As in the IBM attack, we use the fact
that 0 is the default value for data.
Our attack does not use key conjuring, and hence, is eas-
ier to carry out than the IBM attack. As a result of the
attack, the intruder obtains a pin derivation key in clear
(like in the IBM attack).
In the attack we assume that a new key-encryption-key
kek needs to be imported, using the three-part key import
commands (KeyPartImp-First)–(KeyPartImp-Last), which
means that kek = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3, where k1, k2, k3 are the
shares known by three different individuals.
The key kek is then used to import a new pin-derivation
key pdk to the security module, in the form
{pdk}kek⊕pin. (15)
We assume that this message can be seen by the attacker
and that the attacker is the third participant of the process
of importing kek . In particular, the attacker can perform
(KeyPartImp-Last), knows the value k3, and obtains the
message
{k1⊕ k2}km⊕kp⊕imp. (16)
Now we describe the steps of the attack. After the
intruder receives (16), he uses (KeyPartImp-Last) with
k3⊕ pin instead of k3. In this way he obtains
{kek ⊕ pin}km⊕imp (A1)
He uses the same command again, this time with k3⊕pin⊕
exp, obtaining:
{kek ⊕ pin⊕ exp}km⊕imp (A2)
Next, when pdk is imported, the intruder uses (KeyImport)
twice: The first time with input (A1), (15), and type =
data = 0, resulting in the message
{pdk}km⊕data. (A3)
The second time with input (A2), (15), and type = exp,
resulting in the message
{pdk}km⊕exp. (A4)
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Now, using (KeyExport) with input (A3), (A4), and type =
data = 0, the attacker obtains
{pdk}pdk⊕data = {pdk}pdk . (A5)
Finally, using (Decipher) with input (A5) and (A3), the
attacker obtains the clear value of pdk , which can be used to
obtain the PIN for any account number: Given an account
number, the corresponding PIN is derived by encrypting
the account number under pdk .
A Proofs for Section 3
In what follows we will use the following notation: t =̂
AC
t′
if t and t′ are coincide up to transformation modulo AC,
with standard terms kept unchanged. For example, (a ⊕
〈a⊕ b, b〉)⊕ b =̂
AC
(a⊕ b)⊕〈a⊕ b, b〉 6=̂
AC
(a⊕ b)⊕〈b⊕ a, b〉.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Assume that r′ is a complete bad subterm of rθ. We pro-
ceed by structural induction on r and consider the following
cases:
• r = x is a variable: Because θ is ⊕-reduced, so is θ(x).
So, since r′ is a subterm of θ(x) and θ(x) ∼ t, Lemma 3
implies that there exists a complete bad subterm t′ of
t with t′ ∼ r′.
• r = f(r1, . . . , rn), for f 6= ⊕: In this case, t is of the
form f(t1, . . . , tn) with ti ∼ riθ. Since rθ is not bad,
r′ is a subterm of riθ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By
the induction hypothesis, there exists a complete bad
subterm t′ of ti (and thus, of t) with t
′ ∼ r′.
• r = c, for c ∈ C⊕: We have that rθ = r. Since r is C-
dominated it follows that c does not contain complete
bad subterms. Hence, nothing is to show.
• r =̂
AC
c⊕r′′ with c ∈ C⊕ and r′′ /∈ C⊕ standard, but not
a variable: The case that r′ = rθ cannot occur since
this term is not a bad term. Since r is C-dominated,
c does not contain a complete bad subterm. Hence, r′
cannot be a subterm of cθ = c. So r′ is a subterm of
r′′θ.
Let s ∼ r′′θ, for some ⊕-reduced term s ∈ C⊕. So, we
have that t ∼ c⊕s. Since r′′, as a proper subterm of r,
is C-dominated, from the fact that r′ is a complete bad
subterm of r′′θ it follows by the induction hypothesis
that there exists a complete bad subterm t′ of s with
r′ ∼ t′. Now, since c is C-dominated (because by as-
sumption r is), and hence, c does not contain complete
bad subterms, it follows that t′ occurs as a subterm in
t.
• r =̂
AC
c⊕ x, for c ∈ C⊕ and a variable x: Assume that
θ(x) ∼ c′⊕t1⊕· · ·⊕tn with n ≥ 0, c′ ∈ C⊕, and pairwise
⊕-distinct standard terms t1, . . . , tn /∈ C˜. First assume
that r′ = rθ, which implies that n > 1. Then we can
set t′ = t since t′ = t ∼ rθ = r′. Otherwise, since
r is C-dominated, it follows that c does not contain
a complete bad subterm. Hence, r′ is a complete bad
subterm of c′ or there exists i such that r′ is a complete
bad subterm of ti. In any case, this term, let us call it
t′′, does not coincide with any standard term ci with
c = c1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ck because these terms do not contain
complete bad subterms. Hence, t′′ is equivalent to some
term t′ in t. Thus, there exists a complete bad subterm
t′ of t with r′ ∼ t′.
Proof of Lemma 5.
We proceed by structural induction on s:
• s = x is a variable: We can set t′ = t.
• s is standard : Then s 6= t, and thus, for one of the di-
rect subterms s′ of s, s′θ has to contain t as a complete
subterm. By the induction hypothesis, there exists a
variable x ∈ var(s′) ⊆ var(s) such that θ(x) contains a
complete bad subterm t′ with t′ ≃C t.
• s ∈ C⊕: This case is not possible, since s = sθ is C-
dominated, and hence, cannot contain a complete bad
subterm.
• s =̂
AC
c ⊕ s′, where c ∈ C⊕ and s′ /∈ C⊕ is standard,
but not a variable: Then, t 6= sθ since sθ is not a bad
term. Moreover, c is C-dominated (since it belongs to
s), and hence, cannot have t as a subterm. Hence, t
must be a subterm of s′θ and we can use the induction
hypothesis.
• s =̂
AC
c⊕x, for c ∈ C⊕ and a variable x: If t ∼ (c⊕x)θ,
we can choose t′ = θ(x), since t′ ≃C t. Otherwise,
since c is C⊕-dominated, and hence, does not contain
complete bad subterms, it follows that t is a subterm
of θ(x). Hence, we can choose t′ = t.
B Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 12.
We start with showing that matching of C-dominated terms
modulo XOR yields a uniquely determined matcher modulo
XOR, if any, and this matcher can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
Claim 1. Let s be a C-dominated term and t be a ground
term. Then, the matcher of s against t is uniquely deter-
mined modulo XOR, i.e., if sθ ∼ t and sθ′ ∼ t for substi-
tutions θ and θ′, then θ(x) ∼ θ′(x) for every x ∈ var(s).
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Moreover, the matcher of s against t can be computed in
polynomial time in the size of s and t.
Proof. We show how to compute the unique (modulo XOR)
matcher of s against t. The computed matcher will be in
normal form. First, for substitutions σ1 and σ2 we define
σ1 ⊔ σ2 as σ1 ∪ σ2 if for each x ∈ dom(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) we
have that σ1(x) = σ2(x). Otherwise, σ1 ⊔ σ2 is undefined.
We obtain the matcher σ of s against t recursively as
follows. We can assume that both s and t are in normal
form (one can transform a term t into its normal form ptq
in polynomial time)2. We consider the following cases:
1. s = x is a variable: Then σ = {t/x}.
2. s is a ground term: Then σ = ∅ if s = t. Otherwise, the
matcher does not exist.
3. s = c ⊕ s′, for ground c and nonground, standard s′:
Then σ is the matcher of s′ against the term pc⊕ tq.
4. s = f(s1, . . . , sn), for f 6= ⊕, non ground:
If t = f(t1, . . . , tn), we take σ = σ1 ⊔ · · · ⊔ σn, where
σi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is the matcher of si against ti.
Otherwise, i.e. if such a σ does not exist, the matcher
does not exist.
It is easy to show that this algorithm computes a matcher
of s against t, if it exists, and moreover, that this matcher
is unique.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 12: The domain of
every substitution in Σ(t) is polynomial, since it is a subset
of var(t). Hence, it suffices to show that for every variable
in the domain there are only exponentially many possible
values and these values can be computed effectively. This
is clear for the case (i) and (ii) in Definition 4, as C⊕norm is
bounded exponentially (in the size of C).
As for case (iii), let s, x and θ be given as in this case.
Note that s is C-dominated. Hence, θ is the unique matcher
of s against some c ∈ C⊕norm. Because θ can be computed
from s and c in polynomial time and, moreover, both s
and c range over exponentially bounded sets (in fact, F(t)
is polynomial and C⊕norm is exponential), the claim of the
lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 14.
Let t and θ be given as in the lemma. By construction, it
is easy to see that σ = σ(t, θ) ∈ Σ(t). It is also easy to
see that there exists θ′ such that θ = σθ′ and the domain
of θ′ is the set of all variables that occur in some σ(x) for
x ∈ dom(x). Note that θ′ is uniquely determined. Let t′ be
a subterm of t. We need to show that pt′θq = pt′σqθ′. We
proceed by structural induction on t′.
2So far, we defined p·q only for C-dominated terms. Now, we need
to extend the definition of p·q to work for all terms. Such a extension
is straightforward. So we skip it.
First, suppose that t′ ∈ var(t): Let x = t′. We distinguish
the following cases:
(a) If σ(x) was defined according to Definition 5, (a), then
σ(x) = θ(x). It follows that pxθq = pxσqθ′.
(b) Otherwise, if σ(x) was defined according to Defini-
tion 5, (b), then x ∈ F(t), θ(x) = c ⊕ s′, for c ∈ C⊕norm
and some normalized standard term s′ not in C⊕,
and σ(x) = c ⊕ x. It follows that θ′(x) = s′ and
pxσqθ′ = pc⊕xqθ′ = (c⊕x)θ′ = c⊕s′ = pc⊕s′q = pxθq.
(c) Otherwise, if σ(x) was defined according to Definition 5,
(c), then σ(x) = x and θ′(x) = θ(x). Since θ(x) is
normalized, it follows that pxθq = pxσqθ′.
Second, suppose that t′ = f(t1, . . . , tn), for f 6= ⊕:
By the induction hypothesis, it follows that pt′θq =
f(pt1θq, . . . , ptnθq) = f(pt1σqθ
′, . . . , ptnσqθ
′) = pt′σqθ′.
If we suppose that t′ ∼ c, for c ∈ C⊕norm, then it immedi-
ately follows that pt′θq = pt′σqθ′.
Now, suppose that t′ ∼ c ⊕ x, for c ∈ C⊕norm: We distin-
guish the following cases:
(a) If σ(x) was defined according to Definition 5, (a), then
σ(x) = θ(x). It follows that pt′θq = pt′σqθ′.
(b) Otherwise, if σ(x) was defined according to Defini-
tion 5, (b), then x ∈ F(t), θ(x) = c′ ⊕ s′, for c′ ∈ C⊕norm
and some normalized standard term s′ not in C⊕,
and σ(x) = c′ ⊕ x. It follows that θ′(x) = s′ and
pt′σqθ′ = pc⊕c′⊕xqθ′ = pc⊕c′q⊕xθ′ = pc⊕c′q⊕s′ =
pc⊕ c′ ⊕ s′q = pt′θq.
(c) Otherwise, if σ(x) was defined according to Definition 5,
(c), then σ(x) = x and θ′(x) = θ(x). Since x ∈ F(t)
and items (a) and (b) of Definition 5 do not hold, θ′(x)
is a normalized standard term not in C⊕norm. It follows
that pt′θq = pc⊕ θ(x)q = c⊕ θ(x) = pt′σqθ′.
Finally, suppose that t′ ∼ c ⊕ s, for c ∈ C⊕norm and a
C-dominated, standard subterm s of t′ with s /∈ C⊕ and
s /∈ var(t): We distinguish the following cases:
(a) If sθ ∈ C⊕, then σ(x), for x ∈ var(s), was defined
according to Definition 5, (a) since s ∈ F(t). Hence,
σ(x) = θ(x) for all x ∈ var(s), and thus sσ is ground
and sσ = sθ. It follows that pt′θq = pc ⊕ sθq = px ⊕
sσq = px⊕ sσqθ′ = pt′σqθ′.
(b) Otherwise, if sθ /∈ C⊕, by the induction hypothesis it
follows that psθq = psσqθ′. We have also that sσ is not
in C⊕ (otherwise, sθ would be also in C⊕). Moreover,
since sθ /∈ C⊕, we obtain that pt′θq = c ⊕ psθq =
c⊕ psσqθ′ = p(c⊕ s)σqθ′ = pt′σqθ′.
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